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TEE EFFECTS OF FRICTION IN THE CONTROL SYSTEM ON TEE 
HANDLING QUALITIES OF A C-54D AIRPLANE 
By Donald. B. Talmage and John P. Reeder 
During the handling-qualities tests of a C-54D airplane, it was 
found that the friction in the control system was about double the limits 
of the Army and Navy requirements for stability and control. The fricticri 
was reduced to about one-half of the Army-Navy limits by removing the 
autbmatic-pilot servo-units, and this investigation was conducted to 
determine the effects of reducing the friction. Time histories of normal 
landings and of attempts to bracket the edges of a radio beam are presented 
both with the servo-units in and out. Examination and comparison of the 
time histories with high and low friction reveals that friction was partic-
ularly troublesome in precision flying involving small control displacemits 
because with high friction control movement did not necessarily follow all 
force applications. The comparison also shows that the friction requires 
excessive physical exertion on the part of the pilot. The control system 
with approximately double the friction allowed by the Army-Navy require-
ments was unsatisfactory for precision flying, whereas the control system 
with approximately one-half the specified friction was satisfactory. 
INTRODUCTION 
An investigation was conducted on a C-54D airplane to determine - 
whether new or revised handling-qualities requirements were needed to 
cover the problem Of precision flying of large aircraft. During this 
investigation, as reported in reference 1, it was found that the friction 
In the control system was quite high. The pilots objected to this high 
friction because considerable physical effort was required to fly the 
airplane and small control corrections were difficult to apply accurately. 
At the suggestion of the Air Transport Association subcommittee on 
handling qualities, the hydraulic servo-units of the automatic pilot were 
removed in an attempt to reduce the friction in the control system. Results 
of a test program are presented to show the effects of excessive friction.
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TESTS AND RESULTS 
The control friction was measured, both in flight and. on the ground, 
by slowly moving the controls back and forth and recording the control 
forces and control-surface angles. The friction force was equal to one-
half of the algebraib difference in the forces measured while moving the 
control through neutral in opposite directions where pull and right forces 
were considered plus, and push and left forces, minus. The control-cable 
tension with the servo-units removed. was made the same as with, the servo-
units installed. 
The friction in the control system, as measured-on-the ground., is 
showfl in the following table:
TABLE 	 - 
Control
Friction measured on ground 
Servo-units Servo-units 
installed removed 
(ibs) (ibe) 
Elevator lii. ± 1.5 4 ± 1.5 
Aileron 13±1 3±1 
Rudder 22±3 9±3 
The friction as measured in flight is presented in the following 
table:
TABLE II 
Control
Friction measured in flight 
Servo-units Servounits 
installed removed. 
(1bs) (lb-9) 
Elevator 15±4 6±4 
Aileron 12±2 2±2 
Rudder -
 30 ±4 7±4
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With the servo-units installed, the control friction was roughly 
double that allowed in the requirements of references 2-and 3 . Those 
requirements are as follows:
TABLE III 
Maximum friction allowable 
Control specified in references 3 and 
(ibs) 
Elevator 8 
Aileron 6 
Rudder 15
With the servo-units removed
.
, the control friction was well within 
the limits. 
Several flight conditions were investigated both with the servo-
units in and with the servo-units out. Figure 1 presents time histories 
of the control forces and control movements during typical beam-bracketing 
operations, with the two different magnitudes of friction. Figure 2 
presents time histories of typical normal power-off landings with the two 
different magnitudes of friction. 
DISCUSSION 
In the opinion of the pilots, precision flying in the test airplane 
was difficult with the automatic-pilot servo-units installed. For 
flight-path corrections involving large control displacements, the high 
friction was undesirable in that it added to the aerodynamic control 
forces and thereby increased the physical effort involved. For the small 
control displacements necessary in precision flying, where the aerodynamic 
forces were in the range of friction, pilots found it impossible to apply 
accurate small control corrections because, when sufficient force was 
applied to break the static friction, the control jumped to a new position. 
The amount that the control jumped was a function of the flexibility of 
the control system, the difference between the static friction and kinetic 
friction, and the inertia of the system. The pilots attempted to minimize 
the jumping tendency by applying forces of short duration, judging the 
amount of control by the response of the airplane. Pilots do not like to 
fly'this way but prefer to anticipate the airplane's response by the amount 
of control force applied. 	 - 
The high friction in the control system also prevented the control 
from returning completely to its trim position following any displacement. 
The angular motion of the airplane continued when the control was released 
l.	
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and consequently the control had to be returned to Its trim position by 
the pilot. 
The small aerodynamic forces near trim were masked by the high 
friction, an& therefore it was difficult to trim the aerodynamic forces 
accurately to zero. Without the aerodynamic forces trimmed to zero, the 
controls crept from their desired position and repeated control appli-
cation was necessary to reestablish the desired. attitude. 
The preceding considerations indicate that the act of piloting with 
high friction in the control system becomes a continual process of quick 
force applications while moving the control very little. An example is 
presented in figure 1 which shows comparable time histories of beam-
bracketing operations with high and low friction. The continual process 
of quick force applications with high friction is immediately apparent in 
figure 1(a). 
The elevator force varies continually with little motion of the 
elevator; the aileron force, especially around. 28 seconds and 46 seconds, 
varies without motion of the ailerons, and the rudder force, especially 
around 16 and 46 seconds, varies with little movement of the rudder. 
In figure 1(b) the continual quick force applications are nearly absent. 
The physical effort put forth by the pilot is therefore considerably 
increased when friction is present. 
Aside from the standpoint of less physical work for the pilot, there 
is the more important consideration of making the control deflection 
follow closely the control force. Figure 2, which presents time histories 
of power-off landings with high and low control friction, shows how 
excessive friction can destroy the response of the control surface to 
applications of force at the control column. An equal amount of physical 
effort was involved in both landings, but the increased friction in 
figure 2(a) over that in figure 2(b) was sufficient to eliminate any corre-
lation between the respective control forces and deflections. 
For precision flying, the airplane with high friction in the control 
system was unsatisfactory from' the controllability standpoint while the 
airplane with low friction was completely satisfactory. The pilot's 
.opinions substantiated this conclusion. 
Tests were not made of the servo-units themselves todetermine whether 
high friction was inherent in the design or whether it was due to improper 
installation of the units. It is felt, however, that more attention should 
be given to the reduction of friction in tho design and installation of 
automatic-pilot servo-units.
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CONClUSIONS 
From the results of this investigation, it may be concluded that: 
1. High friction in the control system impairs the response of the 
control surface to an application of force at the control column to such 
an extent as to make precision flying extremely difficult. 
2. High control friction requires excessive physical exertion on the 
part of the pilot. 
3. A control system with double the friction limit specified by the 
Army and Navy was unsatisfactory for precision flying, whereas a control 
system with one-half the friction limit was satisfactory. 
Langley Aeronautical Laboratory 
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 
Langley Field, Va.
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(a) Servo-units installed. 
Figure 2.- Time history of a landing. C -54 airplane, flaps full down, gear 
down, power off. 
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(b) Servo-units removed.
Figure 2. - Concluded.
